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Abstract 




1. Introduction: Why Incomes Policy? Why Wootton and Clegg?
Income inequality has returned to the centre of Western public and centre-left academic debate with books like Wilkinson and Pickett’s, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (2009) and Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2015). In Britain, this has displaced the New Labour assumption, from 1997 to 2008, that ‘social exclusion’ was the more serious concern and that fiscal re-distribution was the best way of dealing with this; even if  Giddens’ (1998) The Third Way did speak of exclusion at the bottom and top ends of society. Moreover, the new concern with labour market inequality has borne early fruit, with the unlikely spectacle of a Conservative government implementing some demands of the national Living Wage movement, through a dramatic increase in Labour’s 1999 National Minimum Wage. ‘Britain does not need an incomes policy’, declares one business opponents (Norman 2014). Yet older class arguments about inequality, now centred on high executive pay, have been joined by new demands to address ‘the gender pay gap’ (see Grimshaw and Rubery 2010). 

Thus income inequality has returned as a central IR policy issue, and for the historian these debates call us back to what was called in Britain, between 1945 and 1979, ‘Incomes Policy’. That is a national policy to regulate the fluctuations and distribution of wages, perhaps with links to other sources of income, such as profits, prices and state benefits. This addressed inflation and national economic management on the one hand and income inequality on the other, while raising questions of agency: voluntary or statutory (see Smith 2011, Procter and Rowlinson 2011)? In today’s neo-liberal world, the notion that anything but ‘market forces’ should shape wage levels often seems close to heresy. However, dissatisfaction with spiralling inequality, suggests that the time is right to revisit those post-war debates and learn from them. Are the old IR concepts and policy instruments too worn and rusty to return to use? Do they at least suggest the direction we should be travelling, or does IR need to come up with some entirely novel forms of labour market regulation?

For it is much easier to chart levels of inequality or to call for ‘more equality’ in general moral terms than to construct credible policy solutions to the inequality problem. Such policies need to be politically and economically realistic, in the sense that a government could be elected to carry them out and they could be implemented without damaging the economy and public support. This is not just a technical economic question, since it raises once more a central moral and political question of John Stuart Mill’s (1869) On Liberty: how far can the state go in interfering with the market and private property in a liberal democracy (Wolff 1996: 115-125)? 
As we shall see, the post-war generation of IR academics and social scientists thought deeply about this very question, largely in response to the failure of Communism, that great global, twentieth century movement for class equality. A quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the time has come to recover these fundamental debates about equality and freedom again. Two social science trends make this timely. The first is a growing loss of faith in the efficacy of voluntary collective bargaining by trade unions, especially in liberal-market economies, leading to an increasingly statist turn even by IR Pluralists (Heery 2015). The other is a belated recognition (and assumption), coming from largely outside IR, that labour market pre-distribution (Hacker 2011) through strong collective bargaining, or its equivalent, may be more effective than fiscal re-distribution after the event. Both suggest the state should ‘do more’ but what and how? 

Too often contemporary social scientists in general and IR academics in particular, conduct these current debates, with a sort of Year Zero amnesia, as if there is no useful data from the past and no one has passed this way before. To the contrary, this article suggests that there is much to learn from the post-war IR social democrats and democratic socialists who advocated their own distinctive road to greater equality within a free society. For British IR and centre-left politics,  between 1945 and 1979, was a huge laboratory for experiments and debates over Incomes Policy; a central concern of the field, involving almost all its key actors from the ‘Oxford School’ to Ben Roberts at the LSE. With the triumph of Thatcherism in 1979, these debates fell silent, such that an entire generation of IR academics has lost contact with the old controversy between free collective bargaining and Incomes Policy. In this way, the now distant post-war past becomes a source of myth and nostalgia. One instance is the now rather easy pre-distribution assumption that strong trade unions and free collective bargaining lead directly to greater income equality and that all we need to do is to resuscitate them. This was not how it appeared to mainstream academic social scientists at the time. Equally, big state instruments have been canvassed before and fallen on stony ground. So from a History and Policy​[1]​ perspective, we can learn much about how to approach the new inequality problem by revisiting the post-war Incomes Policy experiments. Did strong British trade unions then contribute to growing equality? If not, why not? Were there more effective statutory mechanisms available? How did practical policy relate to political and moral principles? And all these raise the larger intellectual question: does the IR tradition have the intellectual resources inherited from the past to seriously address the labour market inequality question in a very changed economy and society. 

Why choose Wootton and Clegg to disinter and illuminate the debate? First, because they were the two major academic public policy actors and social science advocates of Incomes Policy during this period; and thus illustrate well the mainstream centre-left view. Moreover, they held much in common. Both engaged with the ‘big picture’ political and moral economy of Incomes Policy, linking labour market analysis to the institutional role of trade unions and to a broader social philosophy. Both served as arbitrators and on commissions of enquiry, though Clegg was the more prominent in the IR field. Both were critical of unfettered, sectional wages militancy under conditions of full employment and state-sponsored free collective bargaining. Both were Keynesians, trained in Economics at Cambridge and Oxford, respectively, who had come to believe that neo-classical theory offered little explanation of how real labour markets worked. And, finally, both were empiricists, who believed that social science followed evidence not abstract theories, and should be pragmatic and contribute to useful knowledge.

Second, while the two supported Incomes Policy in general terms, each understood it differently, on both political and gender grounds.  And these differences matter, since posterity has tended to forget, twist or blur their distinctive contribution to Incomes Policy and forget its place in IR thought. Thus Clegg is remembered as an IR voluntarist and proponent of workplace bargaining reform, as if he had no larger social democratic vision, belying the essential unity of ‘Oxford School’ thinking (Ackers 2007, Kelly 2010). Worse still, Wootton, as a rare woman social scientist of this era, is quite literally forgotten, or ‘hidden from history’ in the IR field (see Rowbotham 1973). This is remarkable, given her public prominence at the time and pioneering writing on income inequality, especially when Dean and Liff (2010) now claim: ‘Equality and Diversity: The Ultimate Industrial Relations Concern’.  Post-war British IR was a male-dominated field and Wootton provides an alternative ‘Feminist’ challenge.​[2]​ Although focused on general income inequality rather than the gender pay gap, her woman’s perspective led her to look closely and critically at the inequalities generated by powerful male union groups, to the detriment of low paid workers such as working women. Moreover, Wootton was democratic socialist, on the Bevanite left of the Labour Party, whereas Clegg’s sympathies lay with the revisionist social democratic right of Gaitskell and Crosland. Hence the two academics speak to a much larger and long-running centre-left IR policy debate about equality and the legitimate role of trade unions and the state.  

This is a reconstructed debate, since Wootton was an outsider to academic IR and there is only the odd recorded incident of direct intellectual contact with Clegg and the ‘Oxford school’, such as below:​[3]​
The Labour peer Lord McCarthy, speaking about economic policy in 1976, complained that he was put off by the sudden appearance beside him of the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton, “because, as Noble Lords will know, she has been the doyenne of academic experts on this subject since her path-making publication The Social Foundations of Incomes [sic] Policy in the early ‘fifties. I felt like giving her my notes…asking her to mark them, and if she did not give me a beta plus, I would not have risen to my feet (Oakley 2011: 284).

Even so, Incomes Policy was a shared preoccupation from the 1950s to the early 1980s and Wootton’s The Social Foundations of Wages Policy (1955) was an early call for a comprehensive approach. She returned with Incomes Policy: An Inquest and a Proposal (1974) and commented on various schemes into the 1980s. Wootton (1897-1988) was an established left-wing public intellectual long before she came to post-war Incomes Policy. By contrast, Clegg (1920-1995), two decades younger, joined the debate through the IR and inflation crisis of the 1960s. Following service as a full-time member of the National Board of Prices and Incomes (NBPI), from 1965 to 1966, Clegg’s How to run an Incomes Policy: and why we made such a mess of the last one (1971), was a reflection on the experience of Labour’s 1960s policies. His public policy career ended as chairman of the public sector Standing Commission on Pay Comparability, from 1979 to 1980 (see  Clegg 1982).

This comparative intellectual history centres on published writing: books, articles and journalism. Here I used Seal and Bean’s (1992) edited selection for Wootton and a wide range of Clegg’s writing. For biographical material, I have drawn on Ann Oakley’s (2011) study of Wootton, various articles on Clegg (Brown 1998, Ackers 2007) and some primary sources.​[4]​  Both academics reflected on actual Incomes Policy experiences, from Attlee’s 1948-50 wages ‘standstill’, through Macmillan’s first formal policies in 1956-57 and 1961-62, to Wilson’s large-scale corporatist experiment with voluntary and statutory policies, from 1964, culminating in the 1974-79 ‘Social Contract’ (see Jones 1973, Panitch 1976, Crouch 1979). However, my focus is not on the mechanics of particular state economic policies or the economic theory behind Incomes Policy, but on the broader moral and political principles and institutional policy solutions that underpin this debate. Wootton constantly refers to an ‘ethical vacuum’ and invokes ‘equality’; while Clegg too calls unions to their moral responsibilities. So what principles are at stake with Incomes Policy then and now?

2. Barbara Wootton: Equality and Incomes Policy
Barbara Wootton completed a Classics degree at Girton College, Cambridge in 1919, but then quickly transferred her energies to Economics, in response to the post Great War mood of a rising labour movement. Through the 1930s she taught adult education at various London colleges, following a period of research for the Labour Party and TUC. Plan or no Plan (1934) followed a visit to the USSR and made the case for socialist planning. ‘Fellow travellers’ tended to be cultural relativists, prepared to endorse authoritarian Communism for backward Russia, but concerned to retain liberal democracy in the West (see Oakley 2011: 107; Caute 1988). By the end of the 1930s, Wootton became influenced by the ideas of Keynes and Beveridge, developing a trenchant critique of neo-classical trends in Lament for Economics (1938). Freedom under Planning (1945) was a direct response to Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and involved a dialogue between the two – discussed below. By now Wootton was highly critical of the USSR. Even so, there is little sense that the Soviet and Nazi experience had challenged her socialist faith in economic planning or that there was any rupture in her thinking as she moved smoothly into post-war reformist politics. Wootton became a Professor at Bedford College and the first woman member of the British House of Lords, but remained throughout her life on the socialist left of the Labour Party: pursuing practical solutions to social problems, while searching in the background for some general alternative to the capitalist social system. 

In the post-war years, Wootton became best known academically for her writing on crime and deviance. However, Social Foundations (1955/1962) was a ground-breaking contribution to Incomes Policy, using arguments she returned to for the rest of her life. These revolve around the problem of income inequality, where its roots lie and how to move in an ‘equalitarian’ direction. Classical economic theory is unable to explain real-life wage hierarchies and relativities; and the gap between theory and practice had grown still wider, as collective bargaining replaced individual and Keynesian demand management maintained permanent full employment. Social factors of class (and gender), status and power, really explain the sheer scale and irrational distribution of income inequalities. Three observable modern social processes reproduce these outcomes: collective bargaining, wages councils and arbitration; each revealing wage-setting as a highly political process, even when it masquerades as an economic one. With the spread of collective bargaining up the status ladder, this too has become a mechanism for vested interests rather than class equality.  

Real pay decisions are ad hoc and opportunist, drive by power and status, but the Government and TUC cover this with ethical language (just, fair), because they’re aware that wage-setting now involves the public interest and can’t be presented as crude ‘smash and grab’ (Wootton 1962: 100) - a slogan constantly returned to. This failure of the state to pursue a clear ethical wages policy, as part of the post-war planned economy, is a remarkable lacuna.  Here Wootton interrogates the actual arguments deployed by unions, employers and arbitrators on various wage-setting bodies. Appeals to the cost-of-living and comparisons with other groups, even ostensible economic cases for ‘labour shortages’, are largely ritual and not backed by evidence.
The picture which emerges is, however, highly significant. It is the picture of a community determined, on the one hand, to fix standards of remuneration that are fair and just as well as economically defensible; and no less determined on the other hand, to abdicate from all responsibility either for the definition of general policy or for the actual decisions made – a community, in fact, which is engaged in the impossible task of attempting to do justice in an ethical vacuum (Wootton 1962: 120).

‘Towards a Rational Wage Policy’, consolidates the classic social democratic argument that post-war Incomes Policy operates in a changed world, of strong but sectional collective bargaining, state engineered full employment and planned industry and welfare, making income distribution a public moral and political issue. Wages policy needs to catch-up and redistributive taxation is not enough. Labour governments should declare, explicitly, their ‘equalitarian principles’ and use these to actively guide arbitration, wages councils and collective bargaining. At this stage, Wootton seems confident that a clear and consistent public argument for equality can reshape the existing patterns of class and status inequality. 

Social Foundations predates and anticipates the major post-war experiments in British Incomes Policy and thus is naturally vague on mechanics. The tenor is co-ordinated but voluntarist, with glances across the channel to the Dutch neo-corporatist experiment, where: ‘Wage policy is but one item in a comprehensive social programme’ (Wootton 1962: 185). The damaging impact of inflation on exports or economic management is a secondary consideration, but the effect of wage-driven inflation on those living on pensions and low wages is a central concern. Here Wootton is highly prescient about the future direction of free collective bargaining.
There is no inherent mechanism in our present system which can with certainty prevent competitive sectional bargaining for wages from setting up a vicious spiral of rising prices under full employment (Wootton 1962: 188). 

Overall, the great strength of Social Foundations is its fundamental sociological analysis of the class and status roots of pay inequality and the processes and arguments that maintain this, linked to a vision of equality that incorporates all source of income. Yet, Wootton’s ethical vacuum is never filled by more than vague references to ‘equality’ (see also Oakley 2011:173-76).

In Social Foundations, trade unions metamorphose from early C20th champions of socialist class politics to post-war exponents of selfish laissez-faire. Here Wootton stood out on a limb as a strident critic of free collective bargaining. Background ‘Feminist’ sympathies and personal resentment at the crude sexual discrimination of that era distinguish her writing from the ‘malestream’ writing of Clegg and others (see Greene 2003). Even though gender inequality and the increasingly irrational claims of the ‘family wage’ are relatively minor themes, the direct contribution of unions to gender inequality seems to fuel this antipathy. Class and gender injustice march together against random labour market inequalities, and, increasingly, Wootton’s case for Incomes Policy arises directly from the failures of collective bargaining – rather than from general societal class inequalities. In ‘The Ethics of the Wage Structure: Retrospect and Prospect’ (1956), trade unions pursue differentials not distributive justice and free collective bargaining becomes an essentially amoral process. ‘The Arbitrator’s Task’ (1958) demands a ‘social policy about wages’ (Seal and Bean 1992: 46, 39). Arbitrators, like Wootton, need ethical principles to guide them, but currently operate in a ‘complete vacuum’, defined by crude haggling and split-the-difference conciliation. If social mechanisms are to operate, these should be explicit and consistent. In 1961:  ‘The collective bargain can I think justly be described as the last stronghold of complete laissez-faire’ (quoted Oakley 2011: 177). As Oakley remarks, ‘Her wrath about this hardened over the years’, as a primary preoccupation with equality was joined by other concerns about economic crisis, wage-driven inflation, unemployment and social disorder. 

By the early 1960s, however, Wootton is responding to the first tentative moves towards formal Incomes Policy, represented by the new National Economic Development Council (NEDC) and the National Incomes Commission of the Conservative government. The second edition of Social Foundations opens: ‘There is always a sour satisfaction to being able to say: “I told you so”…the consequences that are there foretold have now begun to be appreciated’ (Wootton 1962: 3-7). She criticises the Conservative White Paper for not addressing all sources of income equally. 
However, the important thing is that a policy for incomes is now definitely on the agenda of politics…The pattern of incomes moulds the shape of social life and sets the limits of social intercourse; and everywhere that pattern bears the marks of greed and envy and of ruthless bargaining. Now is the time to show that in a civilised society these marks need not be indelible.

 ‘Stopping the Pay Smash and Grab’ (1963), revives that favourite slogan in a shot across the bows of the new militant trade union leaders. She also anticipates more egalitarian Incomes Policies from the forthcoming 1964 Labour Government, quoting Social Foundations: ‘the pattern of income distribution is essentially a political question’ (Seal and Bean 1992: 49, 45, 50). The ‘public interest’ demands ‘a scientifically defensible incomes policy’, able to address the ‘structure of incomes’, because society needs ‘social valuations – the very stuff of which politics are made’. More research and evidence is needed to tackle ‘the lack of information’. 

Two 1974 publications reflect on the fate of the NBPI, after a decade of failed Incomes Policy, and the prospects for Labour’s new voluntary ‘Social Contract’. Wootton again demands something more systematic and statutory. ‘Fair Pay, Relativities and a Policy for Incomes’, argues that ‘fairness’ is a ‘fallacy’ unless linked to clear social principles (Seal and Bean 1992: 17, 20, 21, 27). Collective bargaining has produced ‘conservative results’ shaped by ‘long historical process’, through ‘social conventions and economic pressures’. Indeed, ‘this conservatism has recently been actually strengthened by union militancy’. The new Social Contract doesn’t allow for redistribution since no one loses, while the ‘national interest’ shouldn’t be confused with the trade union interest. The experience of free collective bargaining ‘smash and grab’ (again) is an ‘argument against a purely voluntary system’.  Incomes Policy (1974) offers one big state-administered alternative to the ‘smash and grab’ (once more), an Incomes Gains Tax, administered by the Inland Revenue, which would range across all forms of income (Oakley 2011: 177-78). This would link the rewards of paid work to wider issues of social need, in a context of high inflation; and be anti-inflationary with an in-built social justice bias towards the low paid. Wootton’s criticism of Incomes Policy between 1966 and 1972 was twofold: they were voluntary and they did not include all incomes. Her solution was to create one grand statutory instrument to oversee the process of a rational and just planning of incomes. 

At the close of the post-war era, she would attack the Callaghan Labour Government for its lack on an effective anti-inflation policy: ‘It has not done very much in particular, and it has done it very badly’ (quoted Oakley 2011: 285). ‘Towards Reason in Pay’ (1980) meditates on ‘the catastrophe that befell the 1974-9 Labour Government’ (Seal and Bean 1992: 76, 77, 82) and on Clegg’s new Comparability Commission. The Social Contract was not a real societal contract: ‘More and more unions have woken up to the fact that discomfiture of the general public is often a more effective use of “industrial muscle” than disruption of one’s employer’s business’ – a new angle on the social harm caused by free collective bargaining. ‘Long years of smash and grab (for the last time) interspersed with occasional hastily improvised and temporary “incomes policy” have not produced either social justice or economic sense’. True Incomes Policy had never been tried and, ‘Arbitration Instead of Strikes’ (1983) points out that IR is still settled by force, especially strikes against the general public, making it ‘the last remaining corner of anarchy in our society’. Here Wootton raises the ‘morality of strikes’ and suggests certain semi-automatic forms of arbitration in their place. 

Wootton’s life goal was rational system of income distribution that covered all varieties of income, beyond just wages, and was consistent with clear guiding egalitarian principles. She saw, quite rightly, that the existing distribution was no more than a historical residue of class and gender, power and status, linked to custom and various forms of bargaining power. She also doubted the relevance of Economic supply and demand arguments for income differentials, which were more likely to be the result of the foregoing irrational forces. These inequities - and the trade union contribution to them - were more obvious to Wootton, as a woman academic, than to her male colleagues; as they were to her political equivalent, Barbara Castle. Throughout a long and illustrious public policy career, she returned to the case for a state-impressed pattern of income redistribution in society, ideally through a combination of statutory Incomes Policy and Incomes Tax systems. This was a recipe for social justice, economic efficiency and social order. ‘Her favourite topic – the need for a sensible incomes and pay policy – continue to appear in different formats until she was well into her eighties’ (Oakley 2011: 308). 

There is much to be said for Wootton’s class (and gender) arguments against Marxist proponents of militant free collective bargaining (see Allen 1966, Panitch 1976). However, as political theory they suffer two prima facie limitations. First, alongside other socialist rhetoric about ‘equality’, she did not explain how far, in relative terms, equalising could travel or what the limits were in a liberal democracy. Second, once Wootton’s (1962: 181) early optimism about ‘public education’ had ebbed, to be replaced by statutory measures, her solutions increasing required undiluted state power, with little or no pluralist sense of how the argument about fairness could be won or organized in civil society and democratic politics.

3. Hugh Clegg: Industrial Democracy and Incomes Policy
Hugh Clegg (1920-95) became a Communist at 15 and remained so until 1947, when he was 27 years old (see Brown 1998, Ackers 2007). Twenty years after Wootton, he went up to Magdalen College, Oxford in 1938 to study Classics, but like her wanted to read something more socially relevant and switched to Politics, Philosophy and Economics, with an accent on the first and last. During the 1938/39 academic year, he was a leading figure on the Communist wing of the Oxford Labour Club. His degree was divided by wartime service and, on returning to Magdalen, his Communist faith was broken by political circumstances and the arguments of his philosophy tutor, Harry Weldon (1953). Clegg, gravitated towards a revisionist Cold War social democracy, shared by his future close colleague, Allan Flanders; and in 1949 the pair were appointed Fellow in IR at Nuffield College and University Senior Lecturer in IR, respectively. Clegg’s early writing concentrated on challenging socialist panaceas, such as nationalization and workers’ control, and on developing a political pluralist approach that defined strong trade unions and collective bargaining as an adequate form of Industrial Democracy.

From the late 1950s, the ‘Oxford School’ formed by Clegg and Flanders, turned their research eye to the problems of British workplace IR and developed a strategy of micro-reform through productivity bargaining, pioneered by Flanders’ The Fawley Productivity Agreements (1964), culminating in the 1968 Donovan Royal Commission report on Trade Unions and Employers Associations. However, there was always a larger social democratic architecture to the political and industrial relations thinking of both men. Flanders was an early proponent of Incomes Policy (see Kelly 2010); and Clegg’s practical experience of the NBPI gave him a deep insight into the first experiments in formal Incomes Policy by the new Labour government. Moreover, Clegg had been deeply immersed in the new Keynesian economic thinking at Oxford, just after the war, and like Wootton earlier dismissed the claims of neo-classical Economics to explain the working of real labour markets. His writing illuminates the social democratic grand design of post-war British IR reform: as a system of voluntary, ‘bargained corporatism’ (Crouch 1979), and as part of a fairer distribution of income – in that order, but with the second emphasis growing over time.

Discussion of Incomes Policy began with Clegg’s, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization (1951: 83-88), where one ‘effect of nationalization is to increase pressure towards the national fixation of wages’.  Citing Flanders’, A Policy for Wages (1950), he argues that the ‘long run need is for a general wages policy’, which prevents public employees being unfairly singled out. Moreover, ‘the extension of socialism brings nearer the day when some more intelligent and discriminating wages policy than advocacy of restraint must be applied by the government’ - a reflection on Labour’s crude 1948-50 wages standstill.  ‘Lessons for a National Wages Policy’, in Clegg and Chester’s 1957, Wages Policy in the Health Service, asks whether the new tripartite NHS model could be writ large to tackle inflation, despite ‘the hostility of almost all concerned’, with most unions ‘aggressively antagonistic’. They reference Wootton’s Social Foundations, stressing ‘the importance of criteria’, such as labour shortages, subsistence and differentials, providing these are not ‘so vague as to permit almost any wage increase’. A national tripartite body would require an ‘administrative network’ and ‘powers of enforcement’ that controlled real wages; since payment-by-results was ‘a means of circumventing’ Incomes Policy. The road ahead is obvious, but the prospects of navigating it are poor. For one, ‘the British system of industrial relations is unique, and what has been done abroad is, therefore, not closely relevant’ (Clegg and Chester 1957: 122-25). Moreover, a co-ordinated national wages policy would challenge the Ministry of Labour’s ‘doctrine of non-intervention’ and require a ‘new philosophy’, which transcended powerful voluntarist ‘traditions of the British system of IR’ (Clegg and Chester 1957: 128, 130).

Clegg and Adams (1957), The Employers’ Challenge, a study of the national engineering strike, is more sanguine about the needs for and prospects of Incomes Policy, closing with ‘Some lessons from the dispute’ (142-56). The ordered wartime system is collapsing, with the spread of wage disputes under new, more militant union leaders. Employers had taken a firm line against inflationary wage increases, but government feared conflict more; anticipating another long-term problem for consistent Incomes Policy. Moreover, governments ‘should not underestimate the dangers and difficulties of overturning the system of industrial relations which has been established over the last twenty years’. Only three years after Flanders and Clegg (1954) had celebrated The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, this study anticipates the 1968 Donovan Report by portraying something much more anarchic. Even so, they stress ‘the unworkability of a national wage policy without trade union support’ (Clegg and Adams 1957: 151), establishing Clegg’s life-long conviction that only a voluntary corporatist solution could work within the existing IR framework. But this is not soft soap for the unions. Rather, it is a call for them to stop hiding behind the rhetoric of ‘freedom’ and take-up their national responsibilities; or risk endangering public sympathy, full employment and, ultimately, power. 
British unions have also said on a number of occasions that various government proposals on wage policy are incompatible with ‘voluntary collective bargaining’. This argument is speciously simple. All collective bargaining restrains individual freedom. Otherwise it could not work. National collective bargaining on standard rates is incompatible with “voluntary collective bargaining” on wages in individual firms and districts…the national wage policies of Sweden, of Holland, and of the United States during the war were not incompatible with the existence of a free trade union movement (Clegg and Adams 1957: 153).

Clegg’s 1960s writing, searches for a new institutional IR architecture drawing on wider comparative experience. Typically, his Incomes Policy argument moves from, first, the economic management case, to, second, corporatist IR machinery, and only then to issues of equality. ‘A Policy for Incomes?’ (1962) calls for effective corporatist institutions, like the Dutch or Swedish. Incomes Policy addresses IR problems, notably strikes, inflation and restrictive practices, but also contributes to social justice. As always, Clegg is thinking of a national voluntary process, involving the unions, rather than a statutory policy, imposed by the state from above. ‘Making an Income Policy work’ (1965a), a response to the new Labour Government, makes the political case for a national, voluntary policy agreed with the unions. This requires agreement on a pay norm and the exercise of discipline to enforce this, but while the TUC needs stronger central authority, it has enough to begin the process. Comparative evidence, especially from Sweden, shows that Incomes Policy can work without legal regulation through strong voluntary institutions. Productivity bargaining controls chaotic wages drift, but ‘buying out’ restrictive practices with high wage increases poses a threat to Incomes Policy – which aims to control cost-push inflation and allow growth, but may contribute to greater economic equality. ‘The Lessons of NIC’ (1965b), a commentary on the National Incomes Commission of the previous Tory government,  develops this corporatist argument, balancing consistent principles of distributive justice with workplace IR realities, and rejecting simplistic top-down panacea, such as abolishing payment by results. Like Wootton, Clegg demands more research evidence, both on the comparative experience and British workplace realities – reflecting his new role on the NBPI.

‘Wages Drift – The Achilles Heel of Incomes Policy’ (1965c) goes to the workplace root of the IR problem, as Clegg joined Donovan. Anarchic wages systems, restrictive practices and unofficial strikes all originate in ‘the problem of the power of shop stewards’ (Clegg 1965c: 200), which must be contained for national Incomes Policy to work. Drift from national pay agreements arises from workplace stewards haggling for extra money as overtime, payment by results or local plus rates, and the solution is a managed system of company productivity bargaining, as reported by Flanders (1964). This raises the distributional ethics of Incomes Policy, since through wages drift some workers gain over others – most noticeably the private sector over the public. Fairness is the key to national union consent, without which Incomes Policy will not work; so productivity and fair wages should be balanced in a negotiated national policy. ‘The formula needed to cope with the problems of wage-drift can only work if they have the express approval of those responsible for the policy’ (Clegg 1965c: 200). Incomes Policy is first and foremost about winning political consent, through voluntary agreements with trade unions in the workplace and at TUC level.

‘The case for a National Minimum Wage’ (1967) is an overlooked and visionary piece that reveals the limits of Clegg’s enthusiasm for free collective bargaining. Such a policy lay 30 years into the future, following the 1980s collapse of British collective bargaining. Existing Wages Councils don’t adequately protect the low paid, since some industries, such as retail, are not covered, while low pay is found in otherwise well-organized and well-paid industries. In short, collective bargaining is not protecting the worst off. Moreover, under Incomes Policy, Wages Council awards are often inflationary because they are passed on as differentials to other well-paid workers and the low paid suffer most from rising prices.  A minimum wage could become a deliberate instrument of Incomes Policy, redistributing to the worst-off, providing this was pitched a realistic or experimental level and the push to regain differentials controlled. Overall income redistribution would ease too the transition to equal pay for women. Here, for once, Clegg is thinking more explicitly about a just pattern of incomes, while still trying to integrate this into a corporatist political process.

‘Incomes Policy’ in Clegg (1970: 413-40) The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain makes the economic case and reflects on Labour 1964-70 policy failures. Wages are the largest element of costs in the modern economy and increased labour costs push up prices. ‘Rising prices cause difficulties. They redistribute incomes, and they may diminish savings and weaken confidence (Clegg 1970: 413-14).’ Inflation makes exports less competitive, cheapens imports and leads to a balance of payments crisis. Recent policies had been little break on wages or prices and the central problem was the lack of central discipline exercised by British employers (notably the CBI) and trade unions, compared to the Swedish experience. Incomes Policy needs consistent criteria for exceptions to the general wage norm and more effective corporatist institutions. ‘The Role of Government Agencies’ (1970) assesses the latter: the NBPI, The Manpower and Productivity Service and the Commission for IR. The hoped for transition from short-term IR fire-fighting to a national manpower strategy centred on efficiency and productivity, has not succeeded. Governments remained obsessed with short-term industrial peace, at any price. Even so, the NBPI has been the ‘greatest experiment in government labour policy since the first world war’ (Clegg 1970: 318), and the question of Incomes Policy will return. 

Clegg’s How to run an Incomes Policy (1971), draws together and expands these arguments in his most rounded case. Assessing past failures, his recipe for the trade unions is a new social contract and recovery of ‘moral purpose’ (Clegg 1971: 82). ‘The Purpose of Trade Unions’ and ‘Unions’ Attitudes Today’ (Clegg 1971: 84-88) convey a strong sense of a movement running out of options – and time. ‘Our real problems are the slow and halting growth of our economy, the follies of inflation, the inequities of our pay system and our failure to sustain and expand our social services’. There is an impending crisis of British social democracy and, ‘trade unionists who see nothing wrong with Britain’s record of inflation, slow growth and strike losses. They are blind’. Revolutionary socialists and ‘thoughtless militants’ thrive on the ‘mood of frustration’ and failure to find a solution to the ‘British disease’. Nevertheless, state imposition, like the Tory IR Bill, is not the solution. 
The only effective discipline in a democratic trade union movement is self-discipline, and the source of self-discipline lies in a cause, a principle, or a belief, not a bill. I can see no cause to arouse the British trade union movement which does not include an incomes policy aimed at great equity as much as economic growth, designed to cope effectively with the throng of difficulties which showed themselves in 1964-70, applied by a unified administration (my emphasis).

If the trade unions can’t find the moral vision and will to resolve the British IR crisis, it won’t be resolved at all – or, at least, not within the framework of the post-war social democratic settlement; an argument pursued through the 1970s.

Thus Clegg (1973: 924-26) expresses his long-held scepticism about the egalitarian contribution of trade unions, notwithstanding their contribution to industrial democracy. ‘As things stand, trade unions do little for the general well-being of wage salary-earners. That is accomplished by economic growth’. Inflationary bargaining is self-defeating, merely maintaining differentials, while ‘most unions are associations of relatively high-paid workers seeking to preserve their advantage’. Thus Clegg’s pluralist IR case is primarily about political process rather than economic or social outcomes. But unless the unions, as a national movement, can deliver on the latter the former is in danger. Clegg (1976a) scotches Panitch’s (1976) Marxist attack on social democratic Incomes Policy. Trade unions ‘cannot protect their members’ interests effectively unless inflation is brought under control. Hence the social contract. Such praiseworthy history deserves better political theory from its author’. Clegg’s (1976b) Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining reveals the comparative framework that had underpinned all his writing on Incomes Policy. If British IR was unique, we could still learn from others. The strong central Swedish employers and unions, for instance, had managed to control ‘wages drift’. With the worst economic performance, Britain needs Incomes Policy most of all, but:
with its two-level negotiations and rising factional conflict with the unions, British collective bargaining is probably the least amenable to central control. It seems that an effective long-term incomes policy in Britain will require radical reform of the structure of collective bargaining (Clegg 1976b: 116).

Eight years after Donovan, Clegg still awaits a successful reform of British IR, but by now the real political challenge is coming from the New Right. In response to Brittan and Lilley’s The Delusion of Incomes Policy, Clegg (1977: 440) acknowledges that: ‘many of those who support the current British incomes policy do so because they feared that inflation was putting our democratic society at risk in 1975’.

In Flanders’ (1975) celebrated phrase, Clegg still hopes the unions will choose ‘sword of justice’ over ‘vested interest’ and his last hopes lay with Labour’s 1974-79 ‘Social Contract’.  In The Changing System (1979, Chapter 9: 348, 352) he finds egalitarian hope facing some familiar problems. The 1970 Equal Pay Act had compressed gender pay, while Labour’s solidaristic 1975 policy of a £6 a week flat rate, was ‘precise and simple’. Yet there was growing pressure to restore differentials, while productivity agreements became ‘devices to circumvent the policy’. Looking to ‘The Future’, 
Things might have been different if there had been a continuous incomes policy over a considerable period – if the Prices and Incomes Board had been continued, with union consent, by successive governments; or if, in the future, the General Council were to develop the social contract with Conservative as well as Labour governments. Then there would have to be lasting changes in the relationship between the General Council and affiliated unions; the Confederation of British Industry would have to accept overt responsibility for administering the contract, and alter its structure to suite; trade union officers, shop stewards, and managers would learn new habits which could not be sloughed off in a few week (Clegg 1979: 377)

Just before the 1978/9 ‘Winter of Discontent’ strike wav ended the post-war Incomes Policy experiment and brought the Thatcher neo-liberal to power, Clegg still finds hope in a socially inclusive version of bargained corporatism:
‘the social contract has widened the scope for bargaining to include the whole of government economic and social …[while] governments and unions are becoming more expert at negotiating and administrating incomes policy (Clegg 1979: 379).’


Overall, Clegg was a consistent advocate of voluntary Incomes Policy as an integral element of a British version of social democratic bargained corporatism. His deep comparative knowledge taught that strong, self-disciplining labour and IR institutions were crucial. Incomes Policy was essential on two grounds: first and foremost, to manage inflation and allow the economic growth upon which social democracy depended; second, to contribute towards national efficiency and ensure greater income equality. Militant free collective bargaining, by contrast, merely fuelled inflation and endangered growth, while reinforcing differentials and damaging the poor and badly organized. Most of the time, the egalitarian case was an unspoken assumption, as Clegg concentrated on policy mechanics. Besides, his core case for trade unions and collective bargaining was based on political pluralism not social equality. Increasingly, however, he reached also for the socialist moral case: union power needed other sources of political legitimacy, such as a solidaristic voluntary strategy to build a more productive, fairer society. This said, if the unions couldn’t grasp this nettle, no one else could do it for them.

4. Some underpinnings in Moral and Political Philosophy
The obvious weakness of this dialogue about Incomes Policy is the ease with which the two protagonists evoke ‘socialism’, ‘ethical principles’, ‘fairness’, ‘justice’ and ‘morality’, without grounding these in any serious moral and political philosophy. Thus Wootton refers to Tawney on ‘equality’ and wants less class and status differences; but doesn’t spell-out what inequalities would be justified or how far state-led equality policies can infringe on individual liberty. Clegg makes less explicit moral judgements, but constantly falls back on voluntary moral responsibility. However, any charge of sloppy thinking ignores the wider intellectual context of Wootton and Clegg’s Incomes Policy writing. This section explains how their wider political philosophies relate to larger academic debate about equality, liberty and justice in liberal democracy. 

Wootton and Clegg both referred to themselves as ‘socialists’; a label that in post-war Britain embraced anyone with Labour Party sympathies (see Kolakowski and Hampshire 1977). Moreover, they shared many ideas in common. They were critical of Marxism, which in the early post-war years was directly associated with the Communist Party, and they strongly supported liberal democracy. Their ‘socialism’ was an ethical vision to be approached by pragmatic, empirical policies – whatever works - not some ready-made alternative system of political economy. As positivists, once your moral and political framework had been decided, the real life’s work was its empirical application, as with their work on Incomes Policy. Wootton (1945) had anticipated Crosland’s (1956) distinction between socialist ethical ends and pragmatic means, while Clegg (1951) had demonstrated empirically that socialism as an end didn’t require nationalization as a means. ‘Equality’ was a central Crosland theme too and common language for the two academics. All this said, it remains fruitful to distinguish analytically between Wootton’s democratic socialism and Clegg’s social democracy, as this mirrored the left-right divide amongst post-war European Socialists. 

Wootton’s mature moral and political philosophy is clearly stated in Freedom under Planning (1945), a direct, detailed personal response to Hayek’s, The Road to Serfdom (1944). Hayek argues that planning, as practiced under Communism and National Socialism, leads directly to the destruction of individual liberty. Hence private ownership and a free market are essential to liberal democracy. Wootton acknowledges the totalitarian danger, but counters that Hayek is too deterministic. Planning may destroy freedom, but this is best tested empirically on a case-by-case basis for different practical freedoms: civil, cultural, economic and political. Besides, planning may extend certain freedoms, such as the opportunities of poor people to work and buy goods, while some planning is possible under private ownership. Freedom under Planning becomes an empirical question to be answered by pragmatic trial and error. Wootton (1945: 139-40) cherishes Britain’s liberal democratic heritage and is confident that this can be extended under democratic socialism: ‘A happy and fruitful marriage between freedom and planning can, in short be arranged’ (see also Oakley 2011: 160-62).  A fascinating condensed ‘Debate’ between Wootton and Hayek, ‘Economic Planning: Serfdom or Freedom’, took place in the journal, Left of July 1946. There Wootton concedes once more that:
Professor Hayek cannot, however, be adequately refuted by the naïve device of turning his proposition upside down, and identifying the road to planning with the road to freedom…It is certainly possible to plan ourselves into serfdom.

In response, Hayek compliments ‘her courageous and courteous book’ for taking his arguments seriously, with other ‘truly liberal Socialists’, when the authoritarian Left was ‘far too ready to condemn unseen’. 

Bean and Whynes (1986: x) characterise Wootton as a ‘Benthamite…she once said in a letter to us, happiness is to be preferred to unhappiness and there’s an end to moral philosophy’. In the crucial chapter of Freedom under Planning on ‘Political Freedom’, Wootton (1945: 116-17, 124-25, 127, 138) grounds her democratic socialist argument in a measured version of Utilitarianism.
The essential political freedoms are the right freely to express criticism of the Government and its works; the right to form opposition political parties; the right to replace one Government and legislature by another without resort to force.
 
This tension between political freedom and economic planning may be resolved by reaching a popular, free consensus on ‘the common good’, such as the value of full employment, which becomes a shared ‘preference for one kind of social picture rather than another’. ‘The greatest happiness of the greatest number was a good formula, and, as a definition of social objectives, it has never been improved on’. However, she baulks at crude, majoritarian Utilitarianism and insists that ‘planning and effective political freedom are only compatible in so far as people are really of one mind about what they want to plan for’. Wootton is sanguine about the scope for this democratic consensus, though her optimism enters dangerous territory, when she entertains the distant possibility that a higher consensus may ‘evolve into a one-party state’. 
As long as the agreement is genuine, and the voices of dissent are in no way stifled or perverted, this would be an entirely happy ending to party strife, wholly compatible with the fullest political freedom. Such a one-party state is not the one-party system of totalitarian dictatorships. But it is also, not doubt, for a long time to come, Utopian.

Clegg’s mature political philosophy, from Industrial Democracy and Nationalization (1951: 22, 143) onwards, rejects as reckless such utopian hopes, marking a sharp break with his early Communist beliefs (see Ackers 2007). Dreams of workers control are dismissed in favour of a pluralist, social democratic ‘limited form of democracy’ at work: ‘The trade union is thus industry’s opposition – an opposition which can never become a government’. Co-operation between management and workers, or for that matter trade unions and the state, is possible through negotiation; but any simple application of the ‘common good’ by employers or the state would merely be an exercise in ‘arbitrary power’.  A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (1960), develops Schumpeter and Dahl, to stress free voluntary opposition and the separation of interests as essential to a non-totalitarian liberal democracy, In ‘The Return to Tradition’, Clegg (1960: 29) warns that utopian ‘visions are not tough, nor practical, nor empirical’ and may lead to Fascism or Communism, and champions ‘a practical and empirical creed, the creed of democracy achieved’. His theory of Industrial Democracy through strong independent trade unions is ‘pessimistic and traditional’ and ‘rooted in distrust – distrust of power’, returning to ‘traditions of liberal thought which preceded the rise of socialism’; in short social democratic (see Clegg 1975 too).

So where do Wootton and Clegg’s ideas sit in the philosophical debate about liberty, equality, and justice? Isaiah Berlin (1969) stresses the tension between liberty (negative freedom) and equality (positive freedom), prioritising the former against a potentially totalitarian social vision. For Clegg, free trade unions curb some individual liberties, but defend a larger pluralist liberty against the power of management and the state. In this view, he shares much of Berlin’s intellectual pessimism. Wootton, by contrast, though a highly libertarian social reformer, entertains a larger role for the general will in fostering positive freedoms. In the celebrated debate over distributive justice, both John Rawls (1972) and Robert Nozick (1974) place liberty before equality; though under Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ inequalities are only justified insofar as they benefit the worst off (see Chryssides and Kaler 1993: 167-185, Wolff 1996: 147-195). Arguably, Rawls promotes an egalitarian pattern, not dissimilar to Wootton’s ‘social picture’. Clegg has egalitarian aspirations too, though voluntary process and group entitlement limit the scope for state reform; and whereas the libertarian Nozick attaches ‘entitlement’ to individuals and property within a free market, for Clegg, independent socio-economic groups, operating within a market, share an analogous autonomy from the state. Thus arguments between equality and liberty, pattern and process, figure in the tension between Wootton’s democratic socialism and Clegg’s social democracy. 

5. Conclusion: State and Civil Society in labour market inequality policies
Social democracy does not represent an ideal future; it does not even represent the ideal past. But among the options available to us today, it is better than anything else to hand’ (Judt 2010: 225)

As we have seen, a centre-left political debate lay behind post-war IR thinking about income inequality, while, at the same time, trade unions and collective bargaining were central to a viable social democratic political economy. Now Judt asks: ‘What is Living and What is Dead in Social Democracy?’ And this begs the further question: what part can IR institutions still play in any current notion of pre-distribution? Indeed, it’s hard to imagine either serious labour market reform or social democracy without some such institutions. Thus Wilkinson and Pickett (2010: 17, Figure 2.1) find the current ‘Income gap’ lowest in those north European economies (plus Japan), whose social partnership systems map onto to Hall and Soskice’s (2001) co-ordinated market economy model. So this conclusion compares and contrasts Wootton and Clegg’s approaches to Incomes Policy (see Figure 1), before exploring their continuing relevance for: the relationship between trade unions and inequality; the role of the state and civil society in a broadly social democratic​[5]​ IR policy; and long-term shape institutional IR reform.

(1)	Wootton and Clegg on Incomes Policy. 
For Wootton, the driving democratic socialist question was how Britain could realise planned equality in income distribution. She recognised the inequitable nature of British free collective bargaining, based on fragmented and uneven union bargaining power, linked wages to other forms of income and called for a public debate on the ethical principles which should guide state policy on income inequality. Her long-term goal was to replace privilege and power with an egalitarian state pattern. This also made her gender active, since she addressed the absence of women, as workers or housewives, from the strong bargaining centres. As a democratic socialist, she realised that equality could not simply be imposed on society by the state; but found Incomes Policies via statutory power – covering all incomes and integrated with progressive taxation - particularly attractive for its rational and comprehensive character. 

From Clegg’s social democratic perspective, the policy priority was to embed free trade unions in society, as a countervailing form of industrial democracy. While sympathetic to equal pay, Clegg’s approach could be described as gender passive, insofar as women were absent from the key bargaining groups. Incomes Policy was thus conceived as a very masculine civil society process, centred on strong, sectional trade unions, employers and the state. The latter represented the general public, but wasn’t entitled to suppress voluntary pluralism. Incomes Policy aimed to construct a stable and negotiated corporatist system, which addressed political problems such as inflation and IR disorder. Without this, Britain would suffer economic decline, threatening both the social democratic settlement and industrial democracy. 

Figure 1 Two Rationales for Incomes Policy

                 Ideology          Goal             Gender      Change agent     Policy Method
…………….…………………………………………………………………………….
Wootton   Democratic      Planned        Active       State                   Statutory
                 Socialist           Equality                         Pattern                Power
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
Clegg        Social              Industrial     Passive      Civil Society     Voluntary




There was considerable convergence over the years: as Clegg moved beyond a defensive case for Incomes Policy, as a form of economic management that stabilized IR, towards arguments for economic justice; and Wootton travelled from a concern for general economic equality to engaging with wage-setting institutions . While some saw militant bargaining as a means of redistributing wealth from capital to labour, for Wootton and Clegg this merely stoked inflation and harmed those who lacked bargaining power, were unorganized or dependent on pensions, the real poor. In the end, they converged on an ethical plea for Incomes Policy. 

(2)	Trade Unions and Inequality
Wootton and Clegg agreed that in post-war Britain free collective bargaining didn’t reduce income inequality. Instead, powerful male workgroups fought for selfish and irrational relativities and passed on the consequences in inflationary cost of living increases for the low-paid and unwaged. Would a pre-distribution strategy centred on trade unions have the same impact today? Clearly the labour market has changed dramatically. To take the British example, male manufacturing has shrunk and wages militancy is almost unknown there, while inflation has ceased to be an economic issue and union membership is now concentrated in the highly feminised public sector. But new tensions between work groups have emerged. Relatively well-paid professionals – doctors, teachers, university lecturers – dominate the public sector trade unions, facing the unorganized poor, as service-users, tax payers and victims of industrial action. As Nijhuis (2011, 2013) argues, in a comparison of Britain and the Netherlands, collective bargaining per se is not the issue. Rather, as Clegg (1976) recognised, what matters is the level and structure of collective bargaining and the moral goals of the national labour movement. Centralised, solidaristic bargaining, preferably at tripartite level, does reduce income inequality – as the experience of northern Europe has demonstrated.  In any advanced society, effective pre-distribution would require some larger, lasting ‘social contract’, much superior to the British one that collapsed in 1979.  

(3)	State and Civil Society in social democratic IR policy
Wootton lost faith in trade union agency, early on, and by 1974 she was reaching for ‘a fiscally based incomes policy’ that deployed a social democratic means, re-distributive taxation, as a decidedly state socialist instrument. As Mitchell (1986: 86) observes: ‘It is unusual to use the tax system for purposes quite so near punishment.’ Clegg simply hoped, against the evidence, that as a movement, the British unions could reconcile their legitimate sectional interest with a larger moral vision.  Judt (2010:232) calls for ‘the return of the state to center (sic) stage’, and British IR has observed a ‘juridification’ of employment policy to fill the collective gap. But Clegg’s writing shows just how central voluntary, civil society activity – free trade unions or some equivalent – are, not only to IR pluralism but also to social democracy, both in pragmatic and principled terms - and this remains true in current Germany or Sweden. In sum, social democracy is about much more than the state power and depends on effective employer and employee activity. At the very least, state initiatives need to sponsor voluntary activity.

(4)	The long-term shape of Institutional IR Reform?
Wilkinson and Pickett (2010: 243-45, 249) argue that trade union decline is central to rising inequality and note the wider Voice issue: ‘Not only the extent of unionization but provisions for labour representation in companies are likely to affect wage settlements’. Their main policy hopes rest in ‘democratic employee-ownership’ and ‘an extension of democracy into the workplace’, driven by a ‘social movement for greater equality’ and leading to ‘a transformation of our societies’ (255, 264, 236). To them, ‘The idea that we can’t have both liberty and equality seems to have emerged during the Cold War’, as an over-reaction to Communism’s ‘failed experiment with state ownership’ (263, 252). Such aspirations and arguments were familiar to Wootton and Clegg in the 1950s, as they began to write about Incomes Policy. To move beyond such theoretical and policy generalities, academic IR needs to bring together political philosophy and institutional reform, once again. Here the historical lesson from Wootton and Clegg’s generation is that any putative new IR policy for incomes needs three elements: (1) a serious debate about the ends and means of economic justice; (2) some sense of how the state can stimulate a viable dialogue between the state and voluntary social processes, appropriate to a liberal democratic society; and, in liberal-market economies especially, (3) some plausible, popular and practical institutional reforms that can kick-start the process.
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^2	  Wootton’s relationship to ‘Feminism’ is complex. At times she distances herself from the label, at other moments, such as the 1976 Harrison interview, she is keen to embrace it. Her emphasis is on equality and as a rare woman in a field like labour economics, she appears keen not to be side-lined into ‘women’s issues’ (see Oakley 2011, Meryl Aldridge in Bean and Whynes 1986: 74-91)
^3	  According to William Brown (emails 16 January, 2014), Clegg ‘always spoke very highly of her and the ‘Social Foundations’….He certainly spoke of her as a friend. And as an academic whose work had not got the recognition it deserved’,
^4	  Primary Sources: Wootton Papers at Girton College, Cambridge: Brian Harrison interview (17 February 1976) GCPP Wootton 1/2/10; Unemployment and wages policy, correspondence, CGPP Wootton 4/8; GCPP Wootton 3/4/2, 11. BW and Hayek, ‘Economic Planning: Serfdom or Freedom?’ in Left, 21, November 1946. Clegg Interviews in 2004/5 with George Bain, William Brown, Stephen, Sarah, Eleanor and Peter Clegg, Richard Hyman, Roderick Martin, John Purcell, Keith Sisson, AF Thompson and Dave Winchester;  Brian Harrison interviews in 1987/8 with George Bain, Hugh Clegg, Henry Phelps Brown, Alan Fox, Arthur Marsh and AF Thompson (Philip Waller); and Clegg unpublished Autobiography; Obituaries.
^5	  Here I use ‘social democratic’ in its broadest sense as a counter to ‘neo-liberalism, to also include Christian Democrats, ‘One Nation’ Conservatives and Liberals.
